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Abstract 
From 1871 to 1913, German economic growth was faster than that of the UK.  This represented a 
successful catch-up of the leading European economy but there was still a significant productivity 
gap at the end of the period.  Slower UK growth should be seen as largely unavoidable but there was 
a serious weakness in the national innovation system.  On the whole, the greater openness of the 
British economy was advantageous and a move to protectionist policies would have been damaging.  
The expansion of German industrial production and exports only had a small negative impact on UK 
national income. 
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1. Introduction 
Between 1871 and 1913 economic growth in the UK was considerably slower than in Germany and 
the UK was overtaken by the United States in terms of real GDP per person.  While labour productivity 
growth in the UK slowed down quite markedly in the 1870s and failed to pick up as the second 
industrial revolution gathered pace, the opposite was the case in Germany.  By 1913 Germany had 
reduced the gap in real GDP person with the UK quite considerably and had established a productivity 
lead in the industrial sector.  Evidently, the relative economic decline of the UK which was to continue 
through much of the 20th century had already begun. 
There is a strong tradition in British economic history which alleges that late Victorian (and Edwardian) 
Britain ‘failed’ and that, as a result, economic growth was retarded.  This claim was vigorously disputed 
by the early cliometricians but it cannot be regarded as completely refuted, especially with the advent 
of endogenous growth economics.  The suggestion of failure typically entails the hypothesis that 
British institutions and/or government policies compared unfavourably with those of other countries, 
notably including Germany, and needed reform.  In particular, it has been suggested that the UK could 
have benefited from a German-style banking system, that German policies to promote scientific and 
technological education were superior in the era of the second industrial revolution, and that the UK 
was ill-advised to maintain free-trade when its main rivals including Germany were protectionist. 
A prominent feature of the decades before World War I, especially for contemporaries, was the 
growing Anglo-German trade rivalry.  The populist Made in Germany (Williams, 1896) reflected a 
widespread angst that German prowess in manufactures was undermining Britain’s position in the 
world economy and advocated an end to free trade.  The UK share of world exports of manufactures 
fell while that of Germany increased and Germany rather than the UK established a comparative 
advantage in several new industries.  If there were direct adverse effects of the development of the 
German economy on British economic growth, the trade channel has been seen by some as the 
obvious possibility. 
In what follows, I start in section 2 by setting out the details of comparative growth and productivity 
performance for German and the UK in the period 1871 to 1913.  Then in section 3, I review the 
extensive literature on a possible growth failure in Britain during these years and highlight some areas 
of concern but concluding that there was no massive growth failure.  After that, in section 4 I examine 
the implications of Anglo-German trade rivalry for UK growth performance finding that there is no 
strong evidence that this had serious implications. 
2. Comparative Growth and Productivity Performance 
Over the period 1871 to 1913 the growth of real GDP per person was 1.48 per cent per year in 
Germany compared with 0.81 per cent per year in the UK.  Faster German growth came in the context 
of an initially much lower level of real income and entailed catching up of the UK such that real GDP 
per person rose from 56.2 per cent of the UK level in 1871 to 74.1 per cent by 1913 (Table 1).   
As might be expected, Table 2 shows that faster growth of real GDP per person is largely accounted 
for by superior growth of labour productivity in Germany which averaged 1.75 per cent per year over 
the period 1871-1913 compared with 1.06 per cent per year in the UK during 1873-1913 (Table 2).  
Table 2 also reports that labour productivity growth in Germany speeded up after 1871 whereas in 
the UK the opposite was the case.  Indeed, econometric analysis of UK labour productivity growth 
based on output per hour worked finds that trend growth declined from 2.15 per cent per year in 1869 
to 0.84 per cent in 1890 such that the so-called ‘climacteric’ was in the 1870s not after 1899 as is 
sometimes claimed (Crafts and Mills, 2020). 
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According to the growth accounting exercise which is implemented in Table 2, both capital deepening 
and crude TFP contributions to labour productivity growth were larger in Germany than the UK with 
the latter accounting for a substantial share (64 per cent) of German outperformance over the whole 
period.  The gap in TFP growth between the two countries is quite considerable (0.68 percentage 
points) during the years from the late 19th century to World War I at which point German TFP growth 
was sustained but UK TFP growth weakened appreciably.  An obvious point to note is that a sizeable 
part of the excess of TFP growth in Germany compared with the UK came from structural shift 
associated with a decline in the share of low-productivity employment in agriculture which was an 
important component of catch-up growth.  Schulze (2007) estimated that structural shift contributed 
0.36 percentage points per year to German productivity growth between 1871 and 1910 whereas the 
discussion in Matthews et al. (1982, p.266) implies that it accounted for only 0.06 percentage points 
per year in the UK between 1873 and 1913.   
Ideally, a contribution from labour quality should be included in the accounting but a full treatment 
of this is not feasible.  However, a crude allowance for the impact of education can be attempted.  This 
suggests that rising years of schooling added a bit more to productivity growth (captured in Table 2 by 
TFP) in the UK where it increased from 4.13 years in 1870 to 6.35 years in 1910 than in Germany where 
it went from 5.25 years in 1879 to 6.92 years in 1910 (Morrisson and Murtin, 2009).  If an additional 
year of schooling is assumed to raise labour quality by 6 per cent, the contribution to labour 
productivity growth would have been 0.17 per cent per year in Germany and 0.22 per cent per year in 
the UK over the 40-year period. 
Capital deepening also contributed more to labour productivity growth in Germany than in the UK 
(0.25 percentage points per year) according to the estimates in Table 2.  To some extent this might be 
expected as a corollary of faster TFP growth but its also reflects a significant difference in the decisions 
made by investors in the two countries, as is reported in Table 3.  Over the whole period Germany 
invested 12.8 per cent of GDP at home and 2.0 per cent abroad compared with 8.0 and 4.7 per cent, 
respectively, for the UK.  Savings were a larger share of GDP in Germany but more importantly a much 
higher proportion of savings were invested at home.  Accordingly, the UK had a much larger stock of 
foreign assets in 1913 and net property income from abroad was a much greater proportion of GDP 
(8.6 per cent versus 1.9 per cent).1 
A complementary analysis of contributions to the difference in labour productivity levels (based on 
output per worker) is reported in Table 4.  This shows the gap between the two countries in 1910 is 
almost all due to higher TFP in the UK.  Although the UK was investing heavily abroad at this point, the 
contribution of capital per worker was similar in both Germany and the UK.  Interestingly, given 
common preconceptions to the contrary, there is also little difference in the contribution of labour 
quality.  Slightly more German workers had intermediate skills (9.7 versus 7.5 per cent) but slightly 
more British workers had higher skills (0.9 versus 0.6 per cent) (Broadberry, 2003).  The lower level of 
TFP in Germany may well largely reflect inefficiency in the use of factor inputs rather than an inferior 
level of technology but this awaits further analysis.  In any event, it tends to support the suggestion 
that faster German TFP growth in the preceding decades was largely based on catch-up rather than 
superior technological progress. 
It is also interesting to look at comparative productivity levels at the sectoral level as in Table 5.  Here 
the standout feature is that Germany performed very well in industry but was slow to catch up in 
agriculture and services.  In 1911, a large low-productivity agricultural sector was a major reason for 
                                                          
1 This implies that German GNP per person was 69.6 per cent of the UK level in 1913 compared with 74.1 per 
cent on a GDP basis as in Table 1. 
3 
 
Germany’s labour and TFP productivity gaps with the UK with the services sector making a somewhat 
smaller contribution.  On the other hand, German industrial labour productivity was already ahead of 
the UK level by 1901.  As can be seen in Table 6 relative productivity levels within manufacturing varied 
a great deal in the early 20th century with a marked German superiority in cement, chemicals, iron and 
steel and non-ferrous metals but a British lead in the other activities which can be quantified. 
3. Did Victorian Britain Fail? 
The heading of this section is also the title of a famous article written by McCloskey.  In it he claimed 
that in the pre-First World War period the British economy was ‘growing as rapidly as permitted by 
the growth of its resources and the effective exploitation of the available technology’ (1970a, p. 451).  
This conclusion was based on three very neoclassical arguments.  First, using the insights of the 
traditional growth model, it was argued that devoting more resources to home investment would have 
run into diminishing returns.  Second, it was claimed that the technical choices made by British firms 
were efficient and that the highly competitive market environment ensured that there would be no 
serious and persistent errors at the industry level while the capital market operated to equalize 
returns at the margin to different types of investment.  Third, it was maintained that British 
productivity growth was similar to that in the United States, apart from an inconsequential slowdown 
in the Edwardian period, and in any case could not have been any higher as would be the case with 
exogenous technological progress.  At the same time, in another paper (McCloskey 1970b) he 
calculated that any loss to UK national income from German industrialization was trivial - no more 
than 0.2% in 1913 – and concluded that technology not exports was the key to British prosperity. 
If McCloskey is right, then faster German productivity growth prior to World War I was to be expected 
given its scope for catch-up, was inevitable once Germany embarked on modern economic growth 
and did not have any adverse consequences for the UK.  Allegations of a growth failure continued after 
McCloskey’s intervention including entrepreneurial failure leading to sluggish development and 
adoption of new technology (Landes, 1998), capital market failure with excessive foreign investment 
but too little finance of domestic industry (Kennedy, 1987), and an inadequate national innovation 
system with sub-optimal investment in human capital and R & D (Pollard, 1989). 
Some parts of McCloskey’s defence of British growth performance stand up well to scrutiny.  It is a 
staple of the literature that the only well-established failure to adopt cost-effective new technology, 
namely, not to switch from the Leblanc to the Solvay process in soda manufacture, was in a cartelized 
activity and this is seen as underlining the point that competition was an antidote to entrepreneurial 
failure (Magee, 2004).  In the most-studied choices of technology, the evidence seems clear-cut that 
the British industry was rational to stick with mule spinning for the vast majority of its cotton textiles 
production (Ciliberto, 2010; Leunig, 2001) and that the delay in adopting the basic process for 
steelmaking was justified (Broadberry, 1997; Wengenroth, 1994). 
Although the new economic history has largely succeeded in rejecting claims of managerial failure in 
the pre-1914 British economy, complete exoneration would be going too far.  For example, Crafts et 
al. (2008) quantified the excess of actual over minimum feasible costs for a sample of 14 major railway 
companies and concluded that median cost inefficiency was 10.2% in 1900, equivalent to about 1% of 
GDP.  Two salient features of the railway sector were that competition was weak and so were 
shareholders in companies that were notable for the separation of ownership and control. This 
entailed significant principal-agent problems as railway managers had considerable scope to pursue 
their own objectives and to fail to minimize costs at least while profits remained ‘acceptable’. 
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It has also become clear that there was no major capital market failure.  Foreign investment accounted 
for about a third of all British savings but this was justified by the returns available and the 
diversification of risk that was achieved.2  British investors would not have been well served by 
switching out of foreign assets and into new domestic industries (Chabot and Kurz, 2010; Edelstein, 
1982).  The financial system was not markedly inferior to that of Germany despite oft-repeated claims 
to that effect.  In a specialized capital market, the clearing banks provided valuable support to industry 
through financing working capital while longer term finance could be obtained through corporate 
bonds and equities and, of course, through retained earnings (Chambers, 2014).  The market value of 
corporations was 256 per cent of GDP in 1910 (Hannah, 2015) and the stock of corporate bonds had 
grown to 22 per cent of GDP in 1909 compared with only 0.5 per cent 50 years earlier (Coyle and 
Turner, 2013).  Universal banks in Germany did not make a significant difference to the performance 
of firms with which they had close relationships or supply major amounts of finance for 
industrialization (Edwards and Ogilvie, 1996; Fohlin, 2007).   
Clearly, improvements were necessary but perhaps not in the direction of adopting a German-style 
banking system.  For example, company law was inadequate in various respects which meant company 
accounts did not present adequate information (Edwards, 1989) and that the market for new issues 
was inefficient (Foreman-Peck, 1990).  Accordingly, an adequate market for corporate control through 
takeovers did not exist (Hannah, 1974). 
McCloskey’s claims that British productivity performance was on a par with that of the United States 
are not borne out by the estimates now available.  As was reported in Table 2, labour productivity 
growth in the UK fell from 2.06 per cent per year in 1856-73 to 1.18 per cent in 1873-99 and 0.84 per 
cent in 1899-1913, whereas the United States recorded 2.11 per cent per year in 1874-99 and 1.72 
per cent in 1899-1913 (Kendrick, 1961).3  A critic of UK performance might look at Table 1 and stress 
the failure of productivity growth to accelerate in the early 20th century and to match the much faster 
TFP growth achieved by the United States (1.7 per cent per year in 1899-1929 and 2.3 per cent per 
year in 1929-41) as the second industrial revolution took hold. 
The estimates in Table 7 suggest that the United States had attained a higher TFP level then the UK by 
1911 except in the service sector.  The large TFP gap in manufacturing is especially striking and at first 
sight this may seem to connote British failure.  However, this is rather misleading since these estimates 
reflect the direct impacts of scale economies and natural resources and also of technologies that were 
developed in the American environment to exploit scale and cheap energy (Abramovitz and David, 
2001) but were not appropriate for British conditions.  Cain and Paterson (1986) found that from 1850 
to 1920 technological change in American manufacturing generated economies of scale and entailed 
pervasive materials- and capital-using and labour-saving biases.  Moreover, the network of cumulative 
technological learning was essentially a national one at this time (Nelson and Wright, 1992).4  In the 
second industrial revolution, this underwrote clear American advantages in much cheaper electricity 
(Ristucccia and Solomou, 2014) , which promoted the diffusion of electric motors and the associated 
transformation of American factories, and in mass production of cars, which was not viable in the 
much smaller (and more working-class) British market (Bowden, 1991). 
                                                          
2 These are the conclusions of two recent studies employing modern portfolio theory.  Goetzman and Ukhov 
(2006) found that foreign diversification permitted a big increase in the Sharpe ratio while Chabot and Kurz 
(2010) calculated that the diversification gains were equivalent to a sizeable increase in wealth. 
3 These estimates are for output per man year in the private domestic economy (Kendrick 1961, pp. 333-334). 
4 This amounts to an argument that technology was not universal.  Using this as a defence of McCloskey is 
somewhat ironic because it is not the standard neoclassical assumption. 
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McCloskey’s argument was fundamentally based on an exogenous growth model and the proposition 
that faster UK TFP growth was not possible.  The subsequent development of endogenous growth 
economics complicates matters.  On the one hand, an analysis of this kind might explain the 
unmatched acceleration of American TFP growth as unavoidable given an economic environment that 
was more conducive to innovative effort and tended to produce innovations that were unsuited to 
British conditions.  On the other hand, it might point to policy interventions (perhaps made by rivals 
such as Germany and the United States) that could have raised British TFP growth but were not 
pursued. 
In the early 20th century, the United States had several obvious advantages that endogenous 
innovation theories might stress because they influenced the expected profitability of costly 
innovative effort.  These included a much larger domestic market and capital stock, and a greater 
availability of engineers and science/technology graduates.  Large markets encouraged independent 
inventors (Nicholas, 2010) and partly explain the higher R & D spending of firms in the United States, 
perhaps 0.25% of GDP (in a much bigger economy) compared with 0.02%.  American factor 
endowments encouraged ‘directed technical change’ which was often not appropriate for use in 
British conditions but increased the transatlantic TFP and income gaps.  Labour scarcity in the United 
States may even have increased the rate of technological change (Acemoglu, 2010).  These arguments 
go against the notion of an avoidable failure. 
However, the UK’s national innovation system left a good deal to be desired, compared unfavourably 
with that of Germany, and would have benefited from more pro-active government policy to boost 
technological progress.  This is where an approach based on endogenous growth might undermine 
McCloskey’s position especially in the context of the 2nd industrial revolution as technological progress 
became increasingly science-based.  The UK’s technological performance was mediocre as is 
confirmed by the patenting data (Nicholas, 2014).  While in 1883 the UK share of foreign patents in 
the United States was 34.6 per cent against 18.7 per cent for Germany by 1913 the UK share was 23.3 
per cent compared with 34.0 per cent Germany’s (Pavitt and Soete, 1982).   
Although small beginnings were made in promoting scientific research, for example, through the 
National Physical Laboratory (1899) and the Medical Research Council (1913), public expenditure on 
science and technology was only 0.06 per cent of GDP in 1914.  This undoubtedly implied that there 
was too little government support for R & D, a pro-growth activity where social returns exceed private 
returns.  There was a rapid expansion of scientific and technical education beginning in the late 19 th 
century with significant investments in municipal technical colleges, polytechnics, and red-brick 
universities but in 1910 there were only 3000 science and technology students in UK universities 
compared with 25000 in Germany (Pollard, 1989).  The responsiveness of the German university 
system may have been a key factor behind success in synthetic dyes in particular and the chemical 
industry more generally, a sector in which German outperformance of the UK was very clear both in 
world market share (Brenner and Murmann, 2016) and patenting (Cantwell, 1991).  The build-up of 
knowledge stocks reflected in patenting was also a significant factor in the export success of German 
mechanical engineering (Labuske and Streb, 2008).  Meanwhile, German foreign direct investment in 
the UK reveals strong ownership advantages in the science-based industries of the second industrial 
revolution (Hagen, 1999). 
Overall, it still seems reasonable to conclude that there was no massive growth failure in the pre-1914 
UK economy.  American outperformance probably had its roots in unique American advantages based 
in a favourable configuration of factor prices and market size rather than serious errors by British 
business or governments.  That said, McCloskey (1970) surely went too far and glossed over 
weaknesses in productivity performance. 
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4. Economic Implications of Anglo-German Trade Rivalry 
In the years 1880 to 1913 Germany overtook the UK in terms of its share of world manufacturing 
production which increased from 4.9 per cent to 14.8 per cent while that of the UK fell from 22.9 per 
cent to 13.6 per cent (Bairoch, 1982).  This was accompanied by a narrowing of the gap in shares of 
world manufacturing exports which for Germany rose from 22.4 per cent in 1899 to 26.6 per cent in 
1913 compared with 33.2 and 30.2 per cent, respectively, for the UK.  Losses of market share reduced 
UK exports by $0.36 billion (about 18 per cent) and raised German exports by $0.33 billion over the 
same period (Maizels, 1963).  In the early 20th century, the revealed comparative advantage of the UK 
remained in the old export staples of the industrial-revolution era, especially textiles, while that of 
Germany included new industries such as chemicals and electricals (Crafts, 1989; Varian, 2020). 
The industrialization of Germany was understood by many at the time as a threat to British economic 
prospects.  It provoked demands for the imposition of tariffs on German imports (Hoffman, 1933) and 
intensified demands for protection made by groups such as the Tariff Reform League.  A more 
sophisticated version of the case for intervention was put forward by Richardson (1965) who argued 
that the UK economy was ‘over-committed to its old industries’ and needed infant-industry trade 
policies to encourage the growth of new industries.  In fact, the proponents of tariffs were heavily 
defeated in the 1906 election, the UK remained a ‘free-trade’ economy until World War I and only 
became seriously protectionist in 1932. 
Both Germany and (much more so) the United States employed protectionist policies.  In 1913 average 
German and American tariffs on manufactured imports were 13 and 44 per cent, respectively (Bairoch, 
1993).  It has often been claimed that protection was highly favourable for American economic growth 
and was central to the ascent of the United States to world economic leadership (Chang, 2003).  By 
implication, the UK’s free trade stance was a mistake.  However, detailed analysis suggests otherwise.  
Crafts (2018) noted that slower productivity growth in UK manufacturing compared with the United 
States was intra-sectoral and not a result of having too small a new-industry sector.5  Irwin (2001) 
pointed out that faster productivity growth in the United States mainly accrued in non-traded sectors 
which did not benefit from protection and that American policies did not add up to a successful infant-
industry strategy. 
Germany was less protectionist than the average of western European countries (Hungerland and 
Lampe, 2020) but it did protect agriculture more than manufacturing.  Lehmann and O’Rourke (2011) 
estimate average tariff rates of 12 per cent and 5 per cent, respectively, on the eve of World War I.  
This suggests both that the imposition of tariffs was not a successful infant industry policy and that 
structural change (an important part of catch-up growth in Germany) was retarded.6  Protectionist 
policies also contributed to trade as a share of GDP being lower in Germany (41% in 1913) than in the 
UK (56%).  This can be expected to have had a cost to Germany in terms of lower income and 
productivity – amounting to about 7 per cent of GDP using the elasticity of 0.2 estimated by Feyrer 
(2009).7 
                                                          
5 Indeed, if the sectoral composition of American manufacturing had been the same as in the UK, in 1899-1909 
its total manufacturing labour productivity growth would have increased from 1.65 to 1.73 per cent per year. 
6 Dedinger (2006) explored the issue of the impact of protection on changes in Germany’s comparative 
advantage in exporting and concluded that it was negligible.  However, Webb (1980) asserted that the 
elimination of competition through tariff protection and cartels encouraged investment in technologies that 
were capital and scale-intensive thus raising productivity in the German steel industry. 
7 This is smaller than the often-cited estimate of 0.5 to 0.75 in Feyrer (2019) but is seen by the author as more 
applicable to a case where trade in goods is the relevant channel of influence. 
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More generally, careful econometric analysis of the cross-country evidence does not support the 
hypothesis that higher tariffs raised growth rates in this period – if anything it points to the opposite 
conclusion (Schularick and Solomou, 2011).  This may reflect the tendency for protection not to be 
tightly focused on a few selected sectors with excellent growth prospects or positive externalities for 
the rest of the economy (Tena-Junguito, 2010). 
Similar problems would surely have undermined any British attempt to use protectionism to promote 
faster growth.  The political economy of tariff protection was such that the proposals that had the 
most political support such as those made by Joseph Chamberlain would have actually tended to divert 
employment towards traditional sectors such as agriculture and textiles which were relatively labour 
intensive rather than new growth industries (Thomas, 1984).8  A general tariff policy would have 
weakened competition in product markets with potentially adverse effects on productivity 
performance.  In any case, if the real problem was market failures that implied too little investment in 
human capital and R & D, then the right response was policy intervention by government to address 
these failures directly. 
Although there are endogenous growth models in which protection of manufacturing could improve 
long-run productivity performance, it seems unlikely that this would have been the outcome for the 
late-Victorian UK economy.  American overtaking was not down to protectionism.  The adoption of 
protection in the face of German economic advance would have been an adverse impact of German 
economic development on Britain but it did not happen. 
A traditional explanation for slower UK economic growth from the 1870s is that it resulted from a 
slowdown in export growth (Coppock, 1956; Meyer, 1955).  The volume of British exports grew at 5.9 
per cent per year from 1831 to 1857, 3.5 per cent from 1857 to 1873 but only 2.6 per cent per year 
during 1873 to 1913.  To a considerable extent, this reflected a weakening of exports to industrial 
countries especially in Europe whose share of UK exports fell from 35 per cent in 1865-74 to 24 per 
cent in 1905-13 (Feinstein, 1996).  It may be reasonable to regard this as an exogenous shock which 
could have had adverse consequences but a causal link from this shock to weaker UK productivity 
growth has not been established.9 
McCloskey (1970b) made an admittedly crude estimate of the impact of foreign industrialization on 
British national income.  The methodology was partial equilibrium comparative statics with intelligent 
guesses at relevant elasticities of demand and supply for manufactured exports (treated as a 
composite commodity).  The result was that, if rest of the world manufacturing output was reduced 
to the 1870 level in 1913, the UK loss of producer surplus minus gains to consumers and output from 
redeployment of resources used in exporting manufactures would amount at most to 3.9 and probably 
less than 2 per cent of national income.  The loss from just reducing German manufacturing output to 
the 1870 level would have been about one-eighth of the total.  This exercise could potentially be 
improved upon using modern computable general equilibrium modelling. 
5. Conclusions 
                                                          
8 Thomas estimated that employment in agriculture and textiles would have risen by 45441 and 149851, 
respectively, while employment in chemicals, motor & cycle, and engineering would have risen by 241, 3102, 
and 10619, respectively, had a Chamberlain tariff been introduced in 1907 reflecting the pattern of effective 
protection that this would have entailed. 
9 Feinstein (1996) noted that when export growth revived in the early 20th century UK productivity growth 
continued to slow down. 
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Economic growth in Germany was considerably faster than in the UK after 1871.  To a large extent this 
represents successful catch-up growth at a time when UK productivity growth had slowed down from 
its mid-19th century peak.  Nevertheless, in 1913 real GDP per person and labour productivity in 
Germany were still well below the UK level.  At that point, Germany was held back by a relatively large 
and low-productivity agricultural sector.  In contrast, Germany overtook the UK in industrial labour 
productivity around the turn of the 20th century and was more successful than the UK in developing 
new industries such as chemicals. 
The claim that relatively slow growth connotes a British failure has been hotly disputed.  While 
complete exoneration of British performance would definitely be going too far, it is fair to say that a 
number of well-known criticisms have been refuted including capital market failure, slowness to adopt 
new technology and retention of free trade.  The UK’s main weakness was its national innovation 
system where more pro-active government policies to address market failures would have been 
appropriate.  That said, in any case it was probably not possible to match the big advance in 
productivity growth achieved by the United States in the early 20th century. 
There is no strong reason to think that Germany’s successful economic development had important 
adverse effects on the British economy even though by the early 20th century Germany’s industrial 
strength was increasingly regarded as a threat by British commentators and politicians.  The most 
obvious way in which the UK might have suffered is through international trade and the loss of 
economic rents obtained by its exporters.  However, the only attempt to quantify this loss found that 
its impact was very small. 
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Table 1. Growth of Real GDP/Person, 1871-1913 (% per year) 
Germany 1.48 
UK 0.81 
  
Memorandum Item  
    Real GDP/Person, Germany/UK ($1990GK)  
                                                   1871 56.2 
                                                   1913 74.1 
 
Sources: Maddison (2010), Pfister (2020), Thomas and Dimsdale (2017) 
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Table 2.  Growth Accounting Estimates (% per year) 
 Capital Deepening Crude TFP Growth Y/HW Growth 
    
Germany    
1851-1871 0.39 0.39 0.78 
1871-1898 0.55 1.13 1.68 
1898-1913 0.79 1.10 1.89 
1871-1913 0.63 1.12 1.75 
UK    
1856-1873 0.72 1.34 2.06 
1873-1899 0.37 0.81 1.18 
1899-1913 0.42 0.42 0.84 
1873-1913 0.38 0.68 1.06 
 
Notes:  Derived using a standard neoclassical methodology which imposes the identity ln(Y/HW) =  
ln(K/HW) +  lnA where K is capital, HW is hours worked, Y is real output and A is (crude) total 
factor productivity (TFP). Crude TFP indicates that labour quality is not separately accounted but 
subsumed into TFP.  Labour productivity growth for Germany in 1851-1871 is growth of real output 
per worker.   
Sources: Germany based on output growth from Pfister (2020), capital stock growth from Burhop 
and Wolff (2005), labour force growth from Hoffmann (1965) and hours worked per year from 
Huberman and Minns (2007).  UK from Crafts (2020). 
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Table 3.  Savings and Investment (%GDP) 
 Domestic 
Investment 
Foreign 
Investment 
Savings 
Germany    
1871-1898 11.7 2.2 13.9 
1898-1913 14.8 1.6 16.4 
1871-1913 12.8 2.0 14.8 
UK    
1873-1899   7.9 4.3 12.2 
1899-1913   8.4 5.4 13.8 
1873-1913   8.0 4.7 12.7 
    
Memorandum Item    
Foreign Capital Stock, 1913 ($bn.)    
                    Germany   6.7   
                    UK 19.5   
 
Note: foreign investment equals balance of payments current account surplus. 
Sources: Jorda et al. (2019), Obstfeld and Taylor (2004).  
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Table 4. Contributions to Germany/UK Labour Productivity Gap, 1910 
 Labour Quality Capital TFP Total 
Agriculture 0.0  -5.8 -26.9 -32.7 
Industry 1.6 18.9     1.5   22.0 
Services 0.5  -2.3 -16.9 -18.7 
GDP -0.1   0.2 -24.6 -24.5 
 
Note: These estimates are derived using the standard neoclassical formula for levels accounting: 
ln(Y/L)G – ln(Y/L)UK = α(ln(K/L)G – ln(K/L)UK) + β(ln(HK/L)G – ln(HK/L)UK) + (lnAG - lnA UK).  This is 
implemented using labour quality estimates based on shares of the labour force with no skills, 
intermediate skills, and higher skills weighted by their relative wages.  Labour productivity is 
measured per worker, α= 0.4 and β= 0.6. 
Source: Broadberry (2003) 
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Table 5.  Relative Productivity in Germany at the Sectoral Level (UK = 100) 
 Agriculture Industry Services GDP 
Y/L     
1871 55.7   91.7 62.8 59.5 
1881 54.7   93.7 61.3 57.3 
1891 53.7   99.3 64.4 60.5 
1901 67.2 105.0 71.9 68.4 
1911 67.3 127.7 73.4 75.5 
TFP     
1871 58.3   86.0 69.7 61.6 
1891 59.8   86.1 71.9 63.2 
1911 71.4 102.6 83.2 75.3 
Memorandum Item:  
Shares of Employment (%) 
    
Germany     
1871 49.5 29.1 21.4  
1913 34.5 37.9 27.6  
UK     
1871 22.2 42.4 35.4  
1911 11.8 44.1 44.1  
 
Note: Labour productivity is measured per worker. 
Source: Broadberry (2006) 
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Table 6. Relative Labour Productivity in Manufacturing c. 1907 (UK = 100) 
General Chemicals 126.6 
Coke   98.9 
Iron and Steel 137.8 
Nonferrous Metals 157.9 
Motor Vehicles   89.7 
Cotton   87.3 
Silk   74.9 
Leather   67.8 
Brewing   90.5 
Tobacco   28.3 
Sugar   47.3 
Cement 124.1 
Total Manufacturing 108.4 
 
Source: Broadberry and Burhop (2008) 
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Table 7. USA/UK Productivity Levels in 1911 (UK = 100) 
 Labour 
Productivity 
TFP 
Agriculture 181 208 
Industry 206 161 
    Manufacturing 214 185 
Services 119   79 
GDP 138 106 
 
Sources: Broadberry (2006) revised in accordance with Woltjer (2013) 
 
